China controls Climate Change

China has traditionally taken a different attitude towards negotiation and political discourse. During the period when Zhou Enlai was a very active diplomat, Chinese diplomacy established a tone and approach that still characterises Chinese diplomacy today – it is that of the “third way”. The Chinese gained huge recognition for a new brand of subtle and tactful diplomacy. It is one that employs silence, patience and calculated humility whilst maintaining a clear view on objectives.

The classic example to bring out concerns the incident of a US surveillance plane colliding with a Chinese fighter plane on 1 April 2001. What the Chinese did immediately afterward was to follow a dual approach. This employed a brief silence so as to offer the US a breathing-space within which to “save face” but one that subsequently said that China would both demand and accept a verbal apology.

What came next was a remarkable show of third-way diplomacy; of pragmatism that would not see China relinquish either its pride or a lucrative international relationship. China adapted the definition of what they would accept as an apology so as to tactfully control US sentiment at home and the need for international sensitivity.

China read the situation and environment perfectly. Eventually, both countries were able to have their cake and eat it too: the air crew was released and Washington said on 10 April 2001 that it was “very sorry”. The Chinese sensed that this would satisfy domestic critics who believed that China should not be soft in the international arena whilst not sacrificing US-Sino relations: a fairytale ending.

We have seen another excellent example of how China’s soft diplomacy can win it big gains but this time in a much bigger forum: The UN’s Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen.  Here China’s strategy was again to understand and assess the situation before calculating exactly what the other countries would bring to the table. They also stayed as coy and as silent as it is possible to be in an environment where large international focus is divining every semantic meaning behind every speech.

The Chinese realised that they were in a rather unique position and understood the mechanics of the forum far better than most others. Darren Samuelson of the GreenWire online news group in Washington has been reported by the BBC as comparing China’s presence at the talks to: “the elephant in the corner of the room”. What he means by this is that China no longer fits into either camp that the Kyoto protocol set-up to oppose each other (albeit inadvertently). China was also aware that it was one of the first times it could negotiate with the US on an even-footing and that it needed to appease without causing self-harm.

China is neither an undeveloped, agrarian economy, nor is it a country without pockets of intense poverty. For this reason, it blurs the distinction that President Obama makes between countries that should provide technical and financial assistance and those which should receive it.  It is because of China’s awkward classification problems that the Chinese delegation pursued a subdued yet firm line throughout the summit which Premier Wen Jiabao affirmed.

They demanded that the developed countries make 40% reductions in carbon emissions and that they provide low-carbon technology. The diplomacy allows China to subtly align itself with the developing countries and to raise the stakes of the agreement. China allowed the rift to become wider by shifting some of its might behind lots of countries that typically have little clout in the UN forum. They also refused to comply with methods for verifying industrialised nations’ reduction of emissions; something that the new “deal” requires, as indeed it should, so as to provide transparency and accountability.

Simultaneously however, China announced that it would pay 1% of its GDP a year to the finance pool directed towards developing countries and that it would reduce its own emissions by 40-45%. It proved to the developed countries that it was serious about making developed-country emissions globally worthwhile and that it would contribute whatever little it could spare in the pursuit of a greener globe.

The political take on this shows exactly how the professional employment of third-way diplomacy can pay off. By raising the stakes of the agreement and by volunteering significant cooperation, China effectively guaranteed the weak, please-try-as-hard-as-you-can agreement that the Copenhagen summit closed on. By understanding the UN’s framework, anticipating reactions and by patiently exploiting the polarised politics already present China again played the US off against international expectation.

In the end, it was Tuvalu that swallowed China’s subtly-flavoured bait and led the charge in rejecting the US-backed proposal which means it is not a legally-binding treaty. This is something that China will be happy with if indeed it didn’t deliberately seek to engineer.

China doesn’t want a legally binding treaty – why should it pay for developing countries’ past pollution? China knows it has to fulfill its promise to all its citizens and make them gloriously rich; by legally having to curb emissions they would go a good way towards inhibiting that process. China has already experienced its citizens discontent in falling real-income that even an innocuous rise in the price of pork can generate – telling factories to lower profits by churning out fewer goods so as to comply with a US-backed treaty could cause a whole host of political upheavals.

On the other hand, telling the 874,922,388 Chinese citizens that don’t care about climate change that China can still get away with generating more than three-quarters of its energy by burning coal should feel somewhat close to victory.

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